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ABSTRACT
The cooperative landscape in Ethiopia is very heterogeneous with a
mixture of remains of the pre-1991 government-controlled system and
new post-1991 bottom-up collective action initiatives. This
heterogeneity, coupled with a large growth in the number of
cooperatives in the country, oﬀers an interesting perspective to study
the determinants of the (in)eﬃciency of cooperatives. In this paper, we
analyse the performance of Ethiopian agricultural cooperatives, focusing
on the degree of technical (in)eﬃciency and its determinants. We use
the stochastic frontier approach in which we account for
heteroskedasticity and the monotonicity of production functions,
presenting a methodological improvement with respect to previous
technical eﬃciency studies. The results show that NGO- and
government-initiated cooperatives are less eﬃcient than community-
initiated ones, implying that governments and NGOs should not
interfere too strongly in cooperative formation. Cooperatives with a high
degree of heterogeneity in members’ participation are found to be
about 98% less eﬃcient, while cooperatives that have paid employees
are 33% more eﬃcient. Besides, results show that cooperatives in
Ethiopia function more eﬃciently if they incentivize committee
members through monetary compensation.
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1. Introduction
Cooperatives are prominent institutions in agricultural sectors, especially in developing countries
(Deininger 1995). Given that agricultural systems in Sub-Saharan Africa are typically fragmented
into small or micro farms that are spread over vast and remote rural areas, agricultural cooperatives
are speciﬁcally important in this setting (Wanyama, Develtere, and Pollet 2009). Governments and
NGOs in developing countries often promote cooperatives as organisations to enhance the develop-
ment of the small-scale farm sector (Chibanda, Ortmann, and Lyne 2009). However, it is unclear from
the literature and still contested whether cooperatives can live up to these expectations, and which
forms of cooperative organisation do so most eﬀectively.
A ﬁrst stream of literature analyses the impact of cooperative membership at farm level on
diﬀerent farm performance and household welfare indicators, including productivity and technical
eﬃciency (e.g., Abate, Francesconi, and Getnet 2014), technology adoption (e.g., Shiferaw et al.
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2009; Fischer and Qaim 2012; Abebaw and Haile 2013), producer prices and access to markets (e.g.,
Wollni and Zeller 2007; Bernard, Taﬀesse, and Gabre-Madhin 2008; Francesconi and Heerink 2011),
farm revenue and proﬁts (e.g., Fischer and Qaim 2012; Vandeplas, Minten, and Swinnen 2013), and
household income and poverty (e.g., Ito, Bao, and Su 2012), including studies from various countries
and settings. Although some studies point out that cooperatives fail to create particular beneﬁts for
their members (e.g., Bernard, Taﬀesse, and Gabre-Madhin 2008; Hellin, Lundy, and Meijer 2009;
Poulton, Dorward, and Kydd 2010; Bernard and Taﬀesse 2012; Mujawamariya, D’haese, and Speelman
2013), most studies point to positive eﬀects of cooperative membership. Given this evidence, a more
relevant empirical question becomes whether cooperative characteristics matter and whether certain
cooperatives are more eﬀective in creating gains for their members. This question is rarely addressed
in the empirical literature. Most studies at farm-household level do not distinguish between diﬀerent
cooperatives, or focus only on one cooperative. Only a few papers take into account the heterogen-
eity among cooperatives and point to important diﬀerences in their performance (Fischer and Qaim
2012; Fischer and Qaim 2014; Verhofstadt and Maertens 2014).
The second stream of literature deals with performance at cooperative level and the ability of
cooperatives to function eﬃciently in competitive and global markets (Sexton and Iskow 1993; Gen-
tzoglanis 1997; Soboh et al. 2009). Cooperatives are claimed to be technically ineﬃcient because of
incentive problems – including agency, horizon, portfolio, and free-rider problems – that increase the
costs of monitoring (Cook 1995; Royer 1999). Some empirical studies point to large eﬃciency gaps
between cooperatives and private ﬁrms in the agricultural sector (e.g., Carter 1984; Boyd 1987;
Brada and King 1993; Ahn, Brada, and Méndez 2012). Other studies analyse cooperative-level techni-
cal eﬃciency (TE) and its determinants– thereby implicitly accounting for heterogeneity across coop-
eratives. The eﬃciency of cooperatives is found to depend on total sales (Ariyaratne et al. 2000; Hailu,
Goddard, and Jeﬀrey 2005), the number and the qualiﬁcation of employees (Hailu, Goddard, and
Jeﬀrey 2005; Gómez 2006), the size of the board and training of members (Huang et al. 2013),
ﬁnancial leverage and asset ownership (Ariyaratne et al. 2000; Krasachat and Chimkul 2009; Huang
et al. 2013), and the speciﬁc sector and location in which a cooperative is functioning (Krasachat
and Chimkul 2009; Ahn, Brada, and Méndez 2012). These studies focus mainly on high-income
countries – exceptions are Ahn, Brada, and Méndez (2012) with a focus on coﬀee, sugar and maize
cooperatives in El Salvador; Krasachat and Chimkul (2009) on agricultural cooperatives in Thailand;
and Huang et al. (2013) on agricultural marketing cooperatives in China – and on a limited set of
determinant factors to explain eﬃciency diﬀerences.
In this paper, we analyse the determinants of TE of diverse agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia,
using a stochastic frontier approach (SFA) and cooperative-level survey data. The focus of this
paper is relevant with an innovative contribution in a number of ways. First, the focus on Ethiopia
is particularly relevant. While many studies investigate the impact of cooperative membership at
farm-household level in Ethiopia (e.g., Bernard, Taﬀesse, and Gabre-Madhin 2008; Francesconi and
Heerink 2011; Abebaw and Haile 2013; Abate, Francesconi, and Getnet 2014), only few studies
analyse eﬃciency at cooperative-level in a developing country setting (e.g., Krasachat and Chimkul
2009; Ahn, Brada, and Méndez 2012; Huang et al. 2013), and none in Ethiopia. In addition, there is
a very diverse landscape of agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia with the remains of the pre-1991
government-controlled cooperatives and new post-1991 independent cooperatives. This heterogen-
eity oﬀers an interesting perspective to study the determinants of the (in)eﬃciency of cooperatives,
which are an integral part of the national strategy for agricultural transformation (MoFED 2006) and
very widespread throughout the country (Getnet and Anullo 2012). In our study area, the large
majority of farmers are members of one or several agricultural cooperatives, making the question
of which cooperatives are more eﬃcient, rather than whether or not farmers beneﬁt from cooperative
membership, all the more relevant from a policy perspective.
Second, we contribute to the second stream of literature on eﬃciency at cooperative-level men-
tioned above. We include a large number of variables related to cooperative size, member character-
istics, the formation of the cooperative, and management issues as explanatory variables in our
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model to explain eﬃciency diﬀerences across cooperatives. Existing studies focus on a rather limited
set of variables – mainly variables related to cooperative size and ﬁnancial structure – to explain
(in)eﬃciency, and expanding the set of (in)eﬃciency determinants will enrich the insights on coop-
erative performance. Third, we make a methodological contribution to the SFA by accounting for het-
eroskedasticity associated with cooperative size and type, and by testing for the theoretical
consistency (monotonicity) of the ﬁtted production frontier. Testing for monotonicity allows us to
more correctly assess whether a cooperative producing on the production frontier using a higher
level of a given input should be considered more eﬃcient than a cooperative producing the same
output using a lower level of input below the production frontier. Moreover, since cooperatives
are heterogeneous, assuming a non-constant error variance – as we do in this paper – may lead
to better estimates of TE.
2. Background and data
2.1 Cooperatives in Ethiopia
The government of Ethiopia (GoE) recognises the importance of cooperatives for improving the
socio-economic conditions of the rural poor. Starting from 1994, the GoE has designed various pol-
icies to strengthen the development and operation of cooperatives (Bernard et al. 2010). A Federal
Cooperative Agency was established in 2002 to promote cooperatives throughout the country. It
plays a crucial role in registration, legalisation, auditing, certifying, and monitoring cooperatives
(MoFED 2006). The Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA) is another important government
agency that promotes cooperatives at the federal level (ATA 2012). At district level, two agencies
are supporting cooperatives: the Woreda Bureau of Agriculture and the Woreda Cooperative Pro-
motion Oﬃce (Berhanu and Poulton 2014). Next to governmental agencies, many NGOs are support-
ing cooperative unions and primary cooperatives in Ethiopia. Cooperatives are very important in
distributing agricultural inputs, especially seeds and fertiliser, to farmers. For the 2010 and 2011 crop-
ping seasons, for example, the share of cooperatives in fertiliser marketing was 93% and 95%,
respectively (ATA 2012).
In the Tigray region – the area this study focuses on – there are 4265 registered cooperatives. Of
these, 2255 (52.87%) are specialised (single-purpose) agricultural cooperatives; 690 (16.18%) are
multipurpose cooperatives engaged in both agricultural input supply and marketing activities;
949 (22.25%) are savings and credit cooperatives; and the remaining 371 (8.70%) are service coop-
eratives (TCPMDA 2017). Agricultural cooperatives in the region are visible at all stages of the agri-
cultural value chain (input and credit provisioning, production, processing and marketing) and
support farmers to obtain access to improved agricultural technologies, extension advice and
training.
2.2 Sampling and data collection
A sample of 511 cooperatives was selected in four zones in the Tigray region in Northern Ethiopia
(Figure 1), using a multistage random sampling design. The sample includes seven types of coopera-
tives (multipurpose, cattle fattening, beekeeping, dairy, sheep and goat fattening, irrigation, and
forest and grass cooperatives). In the ﬁrst stage, we randomly selected 12 districts, three from
each of the 4 zones.1 In the second stage, 223 tabias (tabia is the lowest administrative unit) were
randomly selected from the districts, proportionate to the number of agricultural cooperatives in
each district. In the third stage, 511 cooperatives were selected in the 223 tabias. Cooperatives in
the selected tabias were stratiﬁed according to the type of cooperative (multipurpose cooperatives,
beekeeping cooperative, dairy cooperatives, etc.) and selected randomly within these strata and pro-
portionately to the number of cooperatives in the tabia. The ﬁnal sample of 511 cooperatives includes
multipurpose cooperatives (about 35%), cattle fattening cooperatives (about 5%), beekeeping
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cooperatives (about 25%), sheep and goat fattening cooperatives (about 6%), dairy cooperatives
(about 4%), irrigation cooperatives (about 21%), and forest and grass cooperatives (4%). Geographi-
cally, 26% of the sampled cooperatives are from the Eastern zone, 23% from the Central zone, 26%
from the South and Southeast zone, and 25% from the North and Northwest zone, resulting in an
almost uniform distribution of sampled cooperatives across geographical zones.
A semi-structured questionnaire was used to survey the 511 selected cooperatives. We conducted
the data collection using Qualtrics survey software in the period April–August 2017. Prior to conduct-
ing the actual survey, the questionnaire was pre-tested. In addition to the survey, we also collected
available information from cooperative bylaws, audit reports, and cooperative periodic activity
reports, including ﬁnancial statements and strategic plan documents. For our analysis, we use data
on sales, land, labour, capital, membership size, number of employees, and cooperative age from
cooperative documents; and data on members’ participation heterogeneity, age and education of
chairman, members’ education, formation initiative, committees and committee meetings, general
assembly, audit, training, and compensation from the cooperative survey.
2.3 Overview of surveyed cooperatives
Multipurpose cooperatives purchase farm inputs (such as fertilisers, improved seeds, pesticides), farm
tools and equipment (such as sickles, motor pumps, treadle pumps), and consumer goods (such as
sugar, oil, coﬀee) – mainly from a cooperative union – and distribute these to members and non-
members at a preset margin. The Regional Bureaus of Agriculture often provide guidance on the
price at which cooperatives sell farm inputs to farmers (members and non-members). For
example, for fertiliser, the net proﬁt margins that cooperatives are advised to charge range,
among regions, from 0.75 to 3.00 ETB2/quintal for unions and 5.00–7.50 ETB/quintal for primary coop-
eratives (ATA 2012). They mainly serve as a distribution channel of items that the government wants
the farmers to use. Cattle (sheep and goats) fattening cooperatives purchase oxen and cows (sheep
and goats), fatten and resell them. The ownership of the livestock is common in some cases, and indi-
vidual in other cases; and fattening is done jointly on common land in some cases, and individually on
individual land in other cases. Beekeeping cooperatives produce honey and sell it to a union, traders,
or consumers. Honey production can be done collectively on common land with common beehives;
individually on individual land with individual beehives; or on common land but with individual
beehives.
Figure 1. Location of the study area in Tigray region, Ethiopia.
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Dairy cooperatives collect milk frommembers and sell it at a small margin; in some cases the coop-
erative processes milk into cheese, butter, and yoghurt. Some cooperatives buy milk from non-
members as well while others do not. Irrigation cooperatives produce and sell fruits and vegetables,
on irrigated land. In some cases production and marketing are done collectively (on common land
under irrigation); in other cases only marketing is done collectively and production is done on indi-
vidual land served by a common irrigation system; and in still other cases only the irrigation system is
collective. Cooperatives usually ﬁnance motor pumps and canal maintenance, and members use irri-
gation water on a rotating basis, covering fuel expenses individually. In the case of river diversion
(where no pump is needed), the only cooperatively funded expense is canal construction and/or
maintenance costs. Finally, forest and grass cooperatives produce seedlings, grass, and other
natural resource-related products on common land and sell these collectively.
To facilitate the analysis, we reclassify the seven types of cooperatives into three broader cat-
egories: multipurpose cooperatives (MPCs); livestock cooperatives (LBCs), including cattle and
sheep and goat fattening cooperatives, dairy cooperatives, and beekeeping cooperatives; and
natural resource cooperatives (NRCs), including irrigation cooperatives and forest cooperatives.
There is considerable heterogeneity among the cooperatives with diﬀerences in age, size, some
initiated by government, NGO or members, some with hired employees, some jointly owned
land, etc.
3. Method
We use the Battese and Coelli (1995) SFA to estimate and explain the technical ineﬃciency of coop-
eratives. Most studies (e.g., Ariyaratne et al. 1997; Ariyaratne et al. 2000; Krasachat and Chimkul 2009;
Candemir et al. 2011; Soboh, Lansink, and Van Dijk 2012; Huang et al. 2013) use the non-parametric
data envelopment analysis (DEA) to examine the eﬃciency of agricultural cooperatives, and only a
few (e.g., Hailu, Goddard, and Jeﬀrey 2005) use the SFA. The simultaneous estimation of TE scores
and the eﬀect of various covariates on the TE of cooperative organisations is a major contribution
of this paper. We use the SFA to be able to distinguish the eﬀects of noise from the eﬀects of ineﬃ-
ciency,3 and to examine the determinants of cooperative (in)eﬃciency. Since agricultural output or
revenue is a stochastic variable because of weather conditions and other exogenous random
forces (Reinhard, Lovell, and Thijssen 2002), deviations from the frontier might not be entirely
under control of the cooperatives, making the SFA a more appropriate tool for this study.
3.1 Production function
Building upon the technical eﬃciency literature, we specify the stochastic production frontier (SPF)
as:
qi = f (xi ; b) exp (vi − ui), (1)
where qi is the output of cooperative i; xi is a vector of inputs (land, labour, and capital) used by coop-
erative i; b is a vector of technology parameters to be estimated; vi is a two-sided random error term
that is iid N(0, s2v ) distributed; and ui is a non-negative error term that captures the technical ineﬃ-
ciency of cooperative i. To characterise u, we use the half-normal distribution, which is proposed
by Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle (2015) to be most appropriate for ﬁrms operating in a competi-
tive market,4 since the cooperatives in our research area do face competition from private traders and
businesses. We estimate technical ineﬃciency and simultaneously explain it by a set of variables in
one step. The approach parameterises the distribution of u as a function of exogenous variables
that are likely to aﬀect eﬃciency (Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle 2015). Following the existing
literature (e.g., Liu and Zhuang 2000; Chen, Huﬀman, and Rozelle 2009; Huang et al. 2013), we
proxy output by the sum of the sales of agricultural products (both inputs and outputs) each coop-
erative earned in 2016.
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Measuring TE generally assumes output (and not proﬁt) maximisation, given input quantities
(Henningsen and Henning 2009). Since the cooperatives in this study, except for MPCs, are more
of marketing-oriented in nature,5 it seems justiﬁed to assume that they can theoretically work for
sales (a proxy for output) maximisation. Even for MPCs, since the input prices they charge are
rather exogenously determined (determined either by a cooperative union or by the government
– as explained in Section 2.3), sales maximisation can be pursued via, for example, input diversiﬁca-
tion, and not via price maximisation. To estimate the stochastic production frontier, a choice between
the translog and Cobb–Douglas (C–D) speciﬁcations is made by testing the adequacy of each relative
to the other using likelihood ratio (LR) tests. Since diﬀerent cooperatives may employ diﬀerent pro-
duction technologies, the parameters of the SPF may vary across cooperative types. To test for this,
we introduce input-cooperative-type interaction terms into the model. The more general translog
form that nests the C–D is given as:
ln q =b0 + bL ln L+ bB ln B+ bK ln K
+ {0.5bLL ln L( ln L)+ 0.5bBB ln B( ln B)+ 0.5bKK ln K( ln K)
+ bLB ln L( ln B) + bLK ln L( ln K )+ bBK ln B( ln K)}
+ bmLm( ln L)+ bmBm( ln B)+ bmKm( ln K)
+ brLr( ln L)+ brBr( ln B)+ brK r( ln K )+ bmm+ br r + z′bz + v − u,
(2)
where ln stands for natural logarithm; L is the size of land used; B is labour used; K is capital used; m
and r are dummies for multipurpose and resource cooperatives, respectively; z is a vector of zone
dummies allowing for neutral output shift among diﬀerent zones, as in Akridge and Hertel (1992).
Labour refers to the number of hired member and/or non-member employees and committee
and/or ordinary members who are actively engaged in the day-to-day activities of a cooperative.
In the case of cooperatives other than MPCs, labour is proxied by total membership. Since the
nature of these cooperatives does not tolerate idle members, everyone is expected to supply
labour: labour supply is a membership requirement. In MPCs, labour comprises hired employees
and members of management committee, who are active in the day-to-day activities. Equation (2)
represents a ﬂexible production technology that allows the production parameters (of the ﬁrst
order terms) to vary among the three cooperative types. This model can be rewritten for multipur-
pose (Equation (3)), resource (Equation (4)), and livestock (Equation (5)) cooperatives as follows,
where { · } represents the common expression in the curly brackets in Equation (2).
ln q = (b0 + bm)+ (bL + bmL) ln L+ (bB + bmB) ln B+ (bK + bmK ) ln K + { · }+ z′bz + v − u, (3)
ln q = (b0 + br )+ (bL + brL) ln L+ (bB + brB) ln B+ (bK + brK ) ln K + { · }+ z′bz + v − u, (4)
ln q = (b0 + 0)+ (bL + 0) ln L+ (bB + 0) ln B+ (bK + 0) ln K + { · }+ z′bz + v − u. (5)
Our approach allows for testing the assumption of common technology (all cooperative types
have the same technology) by imposing the parameter restrictions given in Equation (6).
H0:bm = br = 0
bmL = brL = 0
bmB = brB = 0
bmK = brK = 0.
(6)
If the parameters vary across cooperative types (H0 is rejected), one can estimate Equations (3), (4),
and (5) separately. However, more precise estimates are obtained by estimating all the parameters
jointly using a system approach (Triebs et al. 2016). Following this line of argument, we estimate
the production technologies of the diﬀerent cooperative types jointly.
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3.2 Ineﬃciency and heteroskedasticity
As technological and market conditions may vary over cooperative types, we include cooperative-
type dummies in the production function in order to control for unobserved heterogeneity.
However, dummy variable models should only be used when the diﬀerent categories have the
same error variance (Gujarati 2003; Holgersson, Nordström, and Öner 2014; Schepers 2016), which
is not likely to be the case in our sample. Due to diﬀerences in themembership-size of individual coop-
eratives of diﬀerent types, the problem of heteroskedasticity could arise. Ignoring the heteroskedas-
ticity of v (u) biases the estimates of TE (both TE and frontier function) parameters (Wang and Schmidt
2002; Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle 2015).6 To account for variance heterogeneity, we follow
Kumbhakar, Wang, and Horncastle (2015) to model the heteroskedasticity of v as a function of mem-
bership-size, and that of u as a function of a vector of observable variables, which can also be used as
ineﬃciency determinants. Thus, following frontier eﬃciency studies (e.g., Caudill and Ford 1993;
Caudill, Ford, and Gropper 1995; Hadri 1999), we employ a model that allows for heteroskedasticity
in ui and vi , and parameterise the variances as:
ui  N+(0, s2ui) withs2ui = exp (w′p) (3)
and
vi  N(0, s2vi) withs2vi = exp (h′k), (4)
where w is a vector of cooperative and member characteristics, formation initiative, and management
and audit variables; h ismembership-size. Note that h and w may overlap with each other and with the
vector x, but must not be functions of q (Wang and Schmidt 2002); p, k are vectors of parameters to
be estimated. The production function coeﬃcients b and the ineﬃciency model parameters p are
estimated by maximum likelihood together with the variance parameters su (SD of u), sv (SD of v),
s2 = s2u + s2v and g = s2u/s2 = the proportion of ineﬃciency variance in total variance.
Similar to previous studies, the vector of ineﬃciency determinants w includes the number of
employees, cooperative age, age of chairman, and training. Since cooperatives are democratically con-
trolled, voluntary, and autonomous associations of persons with common economic and social needs
(ICA 1995) that depend on their members’ patronage, their formation initiation and members’ partici-
pation heterogeneity may impact eﬃciency. Formation initiative refers to whether the formation of a
cooperative was initiated by members themselves, community, or by an external agent, such as gov-
ernment or an NGO. Participation heterogeneity is a dummy variable capturing the degree of hetero-
geneity in members’ participation (1 = high; 0 = low) in meetings, policy crafting, labour supply,
ﬁnancial contribution, patronage (buying from and selling to their cooperative), and other coopera-
tive aﬀairs. Moreover, presence of education committee and committee members’ level of education are
likely to aﬀect the performance of a cooperative, as they are reﬂective of human capital. Timely audit
might also aﬀect eﬃciency by checking fraud and injecting vigilance into the actions of the persons
in charge. As well, since no rational person wants to show unreserved commitment to an unpaid
activity the result of which is a public good (a good or beneﬁt enjoyed by all members regardless
of their contribution towards it), we hypothesise that monetary compensation to committee
members will have a positive eﬀect on the eﬃciency of a cooperative. The eﬀects of membership
size, number of general meetings, and number of management committee meetings on cooperative
eﬃciency are also scant in the literature. Therefore, we include these factors in the vector w as ineﬃ-
ciency determinants. We need to note that potential endogeneity bias cannot be completely ruled
out. Certain variables, like membership size, compensation, number of employees, and audit might
be endogenous in the model, and determined jointly with technical eﬃciency by underlying unob-
served factors. Hence, we need to interpret our results with care and refrain from making to strong
causal claims.
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4. Results and discussion
4.1 Descriptive statistics
In Table 1, we report the mean and SD of the variables used in the SFA model. In about 75% of the
cooperatives, heterogeneity in members’ participation (ﬁnancial contribution, participation in meet-
ings, labour supply, etc.) was found to be high, implying a potential free-rider problem. The average
cooperative was found to have been audited for about 1.5 times in a decade. This is at stark contrast
with the mandatory frequency of audit stipulated in the bylaws of almost all cooperatives, namely
once a year. Committee members are almost never compensated in most of the cooperatives. At
best, only 13% of the MPC pay compensation. Overall, only close to 8% of the cooperatives were
found to compensate committee members for the time and eﬀort they invest in the organisation.
The compensation, which is not a regular payment, is paid in the form of per diem and/or travel
expenses. Regarding formation initiative, 54.7%, 34.7%, 7.3%, and 3.3% of the cooperatives were
initiated by members, government, NGOs, and community, respectively. Community-initiated coop-
eratives are those whose establishment was motivated and endorsed by the community at large,
rather than a few members, or the government, or an NGO. They are mainly transformed from infor-
mal and traditional associations, such as idir (traditional burial association) and iqub (traditional
ﬁnancial association).
4.2 Model adequacy tests
Table 2 reports the results of the LR test for model adequacy, the relevance of the ineﬃciency com-
ponent, and existence of common technology. The null hypothesis of zero second-order coeﬃcients
of land, labour, and capital is rejected. Accordingly, we use the translog speciﬁcation to estimate the
SPF in Equation (2). The null hypothesis of no one-sided error (there is no technical ineﬃciency com-
ponent) is rejected as well, implying that the SFA with ineﬃciency model is a more appropriate rep-
resentation than the standard OLS estimation (Diaz and Sánchez 2008). The third test in Table 2
rejects the null hypothesis of common technology across cooperative types, suggesting that a
pooled model (without interaction terms) is not appropriate for the data. Based on these tests, we
use the translog speciﬁcation with ineﬃciency model and input-cooperative-type interaction
variables.
4.3 Stochastic frontier analysis
Table 3 reports the econometric results of the production and ineﬃciency models. The diagnostic
statistics at the bottom of the table report estimates of the two error components and their shares
in the total error variance. The value of gamma (g = s2u/s2) is reasonably high at 0.886, implying
that the share of the variance of the ineﬃciency component is considerable. This is consistent
with the rejection of the null hypothesis of no technical ineﬃciency component.
4.3.1 Output elasticities and returns to scale (RTS)
The statistically signiﬁcant and positive (negative) parameters of the squared-terms in the production
model imply an increasing (decreasing) marginal product of the input concerned, with the statisti-
cally signiﬁcant and positive ones implying a possible underutilisation of a resource. Statistically sig-
niﬁcant and positive (negative) coeﬃcients of cross-products are indicative of complementarity
(substitutability) between inputs. The results of the heteroskedasticity model indicate the lack of
homoskedasticity in the data. Size is found to be relevant for modelling heteroskedasticity in the idio-
syncratic (random shock) component v of the error term. This shows that the variance of the random
error (equivalently, that of output) is a function of membership-size. On average, the output of coop-
eratives with more members is found to be more volatile. This claim is supported by the data: the SD
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for diﬀerent types of cooperatives.
Variable name Variable description All cooperatives
Multipurpose
cooperatives
Livestock and
beekeeping
cooperatives
Natural resource
cooperatives
Inputs and output:
Output (q) Total sales revenue (1,000 ETB) 77.092 (2.284) 612.164 (1.656) 20.697 (1.541) 26.709 (1.768)
Land (L) Total area of land used (hectare) 0.647 (2.672) 0.080 (2.242) 1.820 (2.084) 3.133 (2.018)
Labour (B) Total labour used (number) 14.910 (0.867) 7.973 (0.249) 18.357 (0.798) 28.474 (0.974)
Capital (K) Total capital (ﬁxed asset) (ETB) 87553 (1.621) 208,981 (1.518) 54176.4 (1.175) 48533.0 (1.834)
Cooperative and member characteristics
Size Natural log of number of members 4.447 (1.967) 6.781 (0.639) 2.910 (0.798) 3.349 (0.974)
Employees Number of non-member employeesa 0.520 (1.631) 0.738 (2.373) 0.420 (0.764) 0.342 (1.184)
Age-coop Years since establishment of the cooperative 9.082 (7.680) 16.59 (6.956) 4.214 (3.419) 5.421 (3.594)
Heterogeneity Heterogeneity in member participation (high = 1) 0.745 (0.437) 0.787 (0.411) 0.733 (0.444) 0.697 (0.462)
Educ-chairman Years of education of chairman 5.824 (2.889) 5.533 (2.513) 6.328 (2.970) 5.421 (3.205)
Age-chairman Age of the chairman 41.49 (10.96) 47.09 (9.929) 37.96 (10.38) 38.56 (9.912)
Educ-members Average year of education of management committee 5.811 (2.537) 6.100 (1.808) 5.656 (2.925) 5.612 (2.799)
Formation initiative
Member-initiated Member-initiated cooperative (yes = 1) 0.547 (0.499) 0.623 (0.487) 0.473 (0.501) 0.553 (0.501)
Government-initiated Government-initiated cooperative (yes = 1) 0.347 (0.477) 0.279 (0.450) 0.374 (0.486) 0.408 (0.495)
NGO-initiated NGO-initiated cooperative (yes = 1) 0.073 (0.260) 0.008 (0.091) 0.153 (0.361) 0.039 (0.196)
Community-initiated Community-initiated cooperative (yes = 1) 0.033 (0.180) 0.090 (0.288) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Management and audits
Educ-committee Presence of an education committee (yes = 1) 0.429 (0.496) 0.533 (0.501) 0.382 (0.488) 0.342 (0.478)
General-assembly Average number of general meetings per year 3.598 (6.391) 1.140 (1.087) 5.738 (7.833) 3.853 (7.243)
Committee-meetings Number of management committee meetings 24.92 (17.94) 26.47 (17.91) 22.58 (15.06) 26.47 (21.91)
Audits Average number of audits per year 0.183 (0.363) 0.248 (0.478) 0.146 (0.300) 0.144 (0.201)
Training Average number of management trainings per year 0.631 (0.659) 0.375 (0.630) 0.775 (0.539) 0.796 (0.767)
Compensation Monetary compensation for committee members (yes = 1) 0.073 (0.260) 0.131 (0.339) 0.038 (0.192) 0.039 (0.196)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
aThe phrase “non-member employees” is used to indicate the exclusion of member employees (in some cases, cooperatives hire their own members as cashiers, guards, or accountants).
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of the output of cooperatives with above-average membership size (SD = 2285) is much higher than
the SD of cooperatives with below-average membership size (SD = 345).
Table 4 presents estimates of elasticities and RTS. Elasticities are computed at the mean input
levels. RTS are the sum of elasticities with respect to each input. Generally, the results are consistent
with economic theory: the marginal products of all the inputs are positive for all cooperative types, as
implied by the positive elasticities. Microeconomic theory requires “well-behaved” production func-
tions monotonically increase in all inputs. The violation of monotonicity inhibits not only a reasonable
interpretation of eﬃciency estimates but also the analysis of factors that might aﬀect TE (Henningsen
and Henning 2009). Besides monotonicity, microeconomic theory often assumes that production
functions are quasi-concave in all inputs, as this implies convex input sets, and hence, decreasing
marginal rates of technical substitution. However, since cooperatives are, at least in principle, not
proﬁt maximising ﬁrms, quasi-concavity may not hold for them. Thus, there is not necessarily a tech-
nical rationale for our production function to be quasi-concave (Henningsen and Henning 2009), and
we do not test our model for this requirement.
Average values of RTS seem to suggest increasing returns to scale (IRS) in MPCs and NRCs (RTS >
1), and constant returns to scale in LBCs (RTS close to 1). The ﬁndings of IRS for MPCs and NRCs imply
that these cooperative types are not operating at optimal scale, probably due to imperfect compe-
tition, constraints on ﬁnance (Coelli et al. 2005), and government intervention. As a result, their
level of overall technical ineﬃciency is likely to be the combination of scale ineﬃciency and pure
technical ineﬃciency. The close-to-unity value of RTS in LBCs, on the other hand, are suggestive of
operation at optimal scale. This implies that pure technical, and not scale, ineﬃciency is the main
cause of overall technical ineﬃciency in these cooperative categories.
4.3.2 Technical (in)eﬃciency
The TE of MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs are about 49%, 88%, and 55%, respectively, indicating signiﬁcant
possibilities to increase eﬃciency levels. On average, technical ineﬃciency could be reduced by
about 36% by operating at optimal scales and/or eliminating pure technical ineﬃciencies in pro-
duction and/or marketing7 via the adoption of the best practices of eﬃcient agricultural cooperatives
(Krasachat and Chimkul 2009). The scale-ineﬃcient cooperatives could be made more eﬃcient by
adjusting their size, at least, in the long run so they can operate at the point where the average
cost (product) is minimised (maximised). LBCs appear to be the most eﬃcient cooperative type. Con-
sidering the most diversiﬁed business they are doing, one would expect MPCs to have the highest TE
as a result of a better spread of labour and capital over broader sales. Yet, high scale ineﬃciency may
be counteracting the eﬃciency gain from diversiﬁcation. Given the ownership of the inputs used by
LBCs, the issue of common pool resources might underlie the highest TE they have. The major
sources of revenue for LBCs are sheep, goats, oxen, cows (meat, milk), and bees (honey). These
animals, in the study area, normally live not only on purchased feed but also on free feed from
open-access land with a negative externality. As long as these external (social) costs are not
accounted for in the eﬃciency analysis, the level of land used (for land is the source of feed) by
these cooperatives is likely to be underestimated. Similarly in the case of beekeeping, even
though the cooperatives have an oﬃcially ﬁxed area of land to operate on, this does not apply to
the bees, which can go anywhere to collect nectars, implying that the major source of sales is not
land-constrained. Therefore, if the externalities are internalised, i.e., land utilisation is seen from
social point of view, the high level of eﬃciency would likely drop.
Table 2. LR tests for functional form, relevance of the ineﬃciency component, and common technology.
Null hypothesis (H0) Test statistic
H0: bij = 0 ∀ i, j = L, B, K 29.16***
H0: su = 0 22.06***
H0: bm = br = 0; bmL = brL = 0; bmB = brB = 0; bmK = brK = 0 378.9***
Signiﬁcance levels are reported as ***1%.
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In the ineﬃciency model, a statistically signiﬁcant and negative (positive) coeﬃcient of a variable
indicates that cooperatives with a larger value of that particular variable tend to have a higher (lower)
level of TE. Given that we cannot rule out the possibility of endogeneity bias, we interpret signiﬁcant
Table 3. Stochastic frontier half-normal model.
Production Model Coeﬃcient S.E
Constant −2.184*** 0.344
lnL 0.153* 0.082
lnB 0.938*** 0.240
lnK 0.548*** 0.126
lnL(lnL) 0.005 0.010
lnB(lnB) 0.065 0.063
lnK(lnK) 0.050** 0.020
lnL(lnB) 0.100*** 0.036
lnL(lnK) −0.065*** 0.018
lnB(lnK) 0.039 0.094
mlnL 0.374*** 0.093
mlnB 0.907 0.553
mlnK −0.586*** 0.180
rlnL 0.178 0.108
rlnB 0.358 0.262
rlnK −0.211 0.145
m 6.270*** 0.709
r 0.599 0.504
Central zone 0.045 0.187
S&SE zone 0.101 0.203
W&NW zone −0.020 0.178
HETEROSKEDASTICITY MODEL
ln(Size) −0.286*** 0.067
Constant 1.147*** 0.263
INEFFICIENCY MODEL
Cooperative and member characteristics
ln(Size) 0.385 0.242
Employees −0.517** 0.201
Age-coop 0.105*** 0.033
Heterogeneity 1.531*** 0.508
Educ-chairman 0.237*** 0.090
Age-chairman 0.408** 0.171
Age-squared −0.005** 0.002
Educ-members −0.073 0.096
Formation initiative (Member-initiated = base category)
Government-initiated 0.666* 0.376
NGO-initiated 1.103 1.006
Community-initiated −2.780** 1.149
Management and audits
Educ-committee 1.024*** 0.380
General-assembly −0.003 0.057
Committee-meetings −0.015 0.010
Audits 0.339 0.430
Training 0.515** 0.252
Compensation −1.774** 0.693
m 2.433** 1.041
r 3.843*** 1.171
Constant −16.388*** 4.656
Diagnostic statistics:
sv 0.716 0.010
su 1.992 0.156
s2 4.480 0.532
g 0.886
Wald chi2 955.55
Prob.> chi2 0.000
Log likelihood −524.56
N 329
Note: ln stands for natural logarithm.
Signiﬁcance levels are reported as ***1%, ** 5%, * 10%.
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coeﬃcients as correlations rather than causations. A unit increase in the number of employees is
associated with a reduction in ineﬃciency of about 33%, 4%, and 26% in MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs,
respectively. This looks a quite plausible ﬁnding assuming that paid employees have expertise in
the area of their employment, and are expected to have a better incentive to focus on their job
than unpaid volunteers (Table 5). This ﬁnding is consistent with the result of Hailu, Goddard, and
Jeﬀrey (2005). On the other hand, a unit increase in cooperative age is found to be associated with
a decrease in eﬃciency of about 7%, 1%, and 5% in MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs, respectively. Contrary
to our ﬁndings, Krasachat and Chimkul (2009) report a positive eﬀect of cooperative age on scale
eﬃciency. Members’ participation heterogeneity is found to be associated with reduced eﬃciency,
for about 98%, 11%, and 76% in MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs, respectively. This may be attributed to a
free-rider problem implied in the participation diﬀerentials among members. Especially in MPCs,
the correlation is very high, implying that multipurpose cooperatives are more prone to the conse-
quences of free-riding problem, probably on account of their large membership size. The negative
correlation bewteen participation heterogeneity and eﬃciency substantiates prior expectations.
Since cooperatives are founded on the member-owner, member-user, and member-beneﬁciary prin-
ciple, members’ participation is very crucial. Members of a well-functioning cooperative exhibit a high
degree of homogeneity in many respects (Höhler and Kuhl 2018) and democratic decision making
processes proﬁt from the homogeneity of interests (Bijman 2005). MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs chaired
by a person with one more year of formal schooling are, respectively found to perform about
15%, 2%, and 12% less eﬃciently. This negative correlation between chairman’s level of education
and eﬃciency deﬁes expectation. A potential reason could be that more educated chairmen are
less committed to their position for some reason. For example, the perceived opportunity-cost of
time spent chairing a cooperative might be higher for persons with higher level of education. As
such, level of education may be serving as an inverse proxy for the level of satisfaction of the chair-
man with his/her current position. This ﬁnding may also be supported by the claim of Liang et al.
Table 4. Elasticities and RTS scores.
Output elasticities with respect to
Coop type Land Labour Capital RTS
Multipurpose cooperatives 0.105 (0.090) 1.164 (0.256) 0.218 (0.138) 1.487 (0.136)
Livestock cooperatives 0.083 (0.099) 0.569 (0.224) 0.568 (0.152) 1.054 (0.196)
Natural resource cooperatives 0.148 (0.125) 1.006 (0.275) 0.334 (0.131) 1.488 (0.274)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Table 5. TE and marginal eﬀects of ineﬃciency determinants.
Cooperative category
Multipurpose
cooperatives Livestock cooperatives
Natural resource
cooperatives
TE scores 0.493 (0.275) 0.879 (0.108) 0.546 (0.225)
Marginal eﬀects
Employees −0.330 (0.290) −0.036 (0.047) −0.258 (0.226)
Age-coop 0.067 (0.059) 0.007 (0.010) 0.052 (0.046)
Heterogeneity 0.976 (0.857) 0.107 (0.139) 0.764 (0.668)
Educ-chairman 0.151 (0.133) 0.017 (0.022) 0.118 (0.103)
Age-chairman 0.260 (0.229) 0.029 (0.037) 0.204 (0.178)
Age-squared −0.003 (0.003) 0.000 (0.000) −0.002 (0.002)
Government-initiated 0.425 (0.373) 0.047 (0.061) 0.332 (0.290)
Community-initiated −1.774 (1.557) −0.195 (0.253) −1.388 (1.213)
Educ-committee 0.653 (0.573) 0.072 (0.093) 0.511 (0.447)
Training 0.329 (0.288) 0.036 (0.047) 0.257 (0.225)
Compensation −1.132 (0.994) −0.124 (0.162) −0.886 (0.774)
Notes: Standard deviations (SD) are reported in parentheses. Only the marginal eﬀects of variables with signiﬁcant coeﬃcients in
Table 3 are reported.
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(2015) that professional management widens the gap between members and management, assum-
ing that a higher level of education creates a feeling of professionalism on the chairman’s part.
A unit increase in chairman’s age is found to be associated with a decrease in eﬃciency of about
26%, 3%, and 20% in MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs, respectively up to a point beyond which the relation-
ship becomes positive. This u-shaped relation implies that cooperatives led by young and old chair-
men operate more eﬃciently compared to those led by middle-aged chairmen. Probably, this is due
to the possibility that young chairmen are more eager and cautious, and old chairmen are more
experienced, and hence more knowledgeable in management practices as compared to the
middle-aged ones. Findings regarding formation initiative are consistent with expectation. A volun-
tary and self-initiated8 eﬀort is more likely to be successful than an externally-initiated (top-down)
one. In the study area, typically, the idea to form a cooperative comes from a donor, or the govern-
ment in an attempt to address youth unemployment. In so doing, little attention is paid to the com-
monality – in terms of interest, needs, goals, etc. – among the founding members. Externally
induced cooperatives are less likely to have members with common needs and aspirations. The
top-down nature of cooperatives is often claimed to discourage member involvement (Dunn
1988) though it can potentially be a solution in settings where social capital is too low to allow
for the grassroots emergence of cooperatives, as has been documented for Russia (Kurakin and
Visser 2017).
Results show that community-initiated cooperatives are most eﬃcient as compared to member-,
NGO-, and government-initiated ones. Government-initiated cooperatives are also found to be less
eﬃcient than self-initiated cooperatives. The marginal eﬀects are large enough to count against
the involvement of governments in the initiation of cooperatives: a clear policy issue is that govern-
ments should refrain from initiating cooperatives. On the other hand, no signiﬁcant diﬀerence was
found in the eﬃciency of member-initiated (reference category) and NGO-initiated (insigniﬁcant
coeﬃcient) cooperatives.
We also ﬁnd that MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs with an education committee perform about 65%, 7%, and
51% less eﬃciently than those without, respectively. A possible explanation for this counterintuitive
result is that the members of the committee may be getting idle under the disguise of that position.
Their contribution as committee members might be too low to make up for the forgone labour hours
they would supply as ordinary members. Contrary to normal expectations and the ﬁnding of Huang
et al. (2013), a unit increase in the number of trainings is found to reduce eﬃciency by about 33%, 4%,
and 26% in MPCs, LBCs, and NRCs, respectively. This ﬁnding suggests that the ﬁnance, time, and other
human and material resources the government commits to trainings deserve serious scrutiny. For
example, it should be made certain that: (1) trainings are compatible with the practical problems
cooperatives face; (2) the trainers have the appropriate expertise; and (3) the trainees are the right
persons the training should be targeted to.
Cooperatives that compensate their committee members are found to be more eﬃcient than
their “non-compensating” counterparts. Given the very low number of cooperatives with a compen-
sation scheme (only about 8%) in the sample, the fact that this variable turns out with a signiﬁcant
eﬀect is impressive. More surprisingly, during the interview, many respondents said that compen-
sation would not make a diﬀerence. Some likened the cooperative and the committee members
with husband and wife, and said: “Using cooperative resources to compensate committee
members for what they do for their own cooperative will be like taking money from a husband
and giving it to his wife, which makes no diﬀerence.” Others would say: “What diﬀerence do I
make if I take money from my left pocket and put it in my right pocket?” Still others said that
they are already exerting the maximum possible eﬀort to run their cooperative so that compen-
sation would have no eﬀect at all: “Whether I get compensation or not, I cannot be more committed
to the cooperative than I already am”, they would say. One particular respondent reacted to the
same question this way: “Listen brother, let alone a cooperative, we are leading a district for
free. It is not a big deal.” There was another respondent whose attitude seems to lend a fresh per-
spective to the issue: “No, taking compensation, big or small it doesn’t matter, would make ordinary
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members think that committee members should shoulder every responsibility in the cooperative.
This will erode the commitment of ordinary members”, said he. Despite all this, however, compen-
sation appears to promote TE. One might suspect that there is something diﬀerent about these 8%
cooperatives. That is, their better TE and the fact that they compensate committee members may
be driven by a better endowment (money) as compared to the other cooperatives. However, a t-test
on the equality of average capital – a proxy for endowment – of the 8% and the rest 92% revealed
no signiﬁcant mean diﬀerence (t = 0.237; p = 0.813). Thus, there seems to be a disagreement
between the respondents’ opinion about the eﬀect of compensation on their commitment – and
hence performance – and its practical eﬀect.
Though the direction of relationship of most of the variables with TE looks plausible, the magni-
tudes of some of the marginal eﬀects seem to be rather high and should be interpreted very carefully,
and not at face value. For example, the average diﬀerence of eﬃciency (about 71%) between coop-
eratives with and without compensation scheme is apparently very high. However, by design of our
model, the value represents the conditional expectation rather than the causal eﬀect of compensation:
it shows the diﬀerence in the level of TE between two separate cooperatives, one with and the other
without compensation scheme, rather than the extent by which the ineﬃciency of a given non-com-
pensating cooperative would reduce had it opted for compensating its committee members. In the
ﬁrst interpretation, the unobservable factors aﬀecting TE are not assumed to be constant across the
two cooperatives, while in the second interpretation, not only the included variables but also the
unobservables in the error term are kept constant (Verbeek 2012). Therefore, the estimated marginal
eﬀects are likely to have captured, at least partly, the eﬀect of diﬀerences in unobserved cooperative
characteristics as well.
5. Conclusion
In this article, we investigate the performance of agricultural cooperatives in Ethiopia by analysing the
determinants of their technical eﬃciency using a stochastic frontier approach. We ﬁnd an average
technical eﬃciency of 64% with diﬀerences in eﬃciency scores for diﬀerent types of cooperatives
with diﬀerent activities. The results point out that more recent cooperatives are more eﬃcient;
and that cooperatives initiated in a bottom-up way by the community are more eﬃcient than top-
down cooperatives formed through government- and NGO-initiatives. We ﬁnd that heterogeneity
in the level of member participation in the cooperative is detrimental to its eﬃciency, while monetary
compensation for committee members improves eﬃciency. Some clear-cut policy and research rec-
ommendations follow from our results.
First, governments and NGOs should refrain from interfering too much with the formation of
cooperatives in Ethiopia. Already for decades, there is considerable donor and policy attention for
cooperation and horizontal coordination among farmers in order to reduce transaction costs and
overcome market imperfections and constraints in agricultural production and improve the perform-
ance of the smallholder farm sector in developing countries. Yet, interfering too strongly in stimulat-
ing this cooperation through top-down initiation of cooperatives is counterproductive for the
eﬃciency of the cooperative institutions created.
Second, cooperatives can optimise their rules and management practices to operate more
eﬃciently. Our results imply that cooperatives with paid employees and those that incentivize com-
mittee members for their leadership role through monetary compensation would be more techni-
cally eﬃcient. Third, our analysis points to several cooperative characteristics that determine the
eﬃciency of cooperatives. These variables may also be relevant in studies estimating the eﬀects of
cooperative membership at the farm-household level in order to analyse heterogeneous eﬀects of
cooperative membership. Especially variables related to the formation and heterogeneity among
members might be speciﬁcally relevant in such studies.
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Notes
1. The selected districts include Atsbi-Wenberta, Ganta-Afeshum, and Gulomkeda from the Eastern zone; Abergele,
DeguaTembien, and Mereb-Leke from the Central zone; Alaje, Enderta, and Samre from the South & Southeastern
(S&SE) zone; Asigede-Tsimbela, Tsegede, and Wolqayt from the West & Northwestern (N&NW) zone.
2. ETB (Ethiopian Birr) ≈ 0.04USD at the time of the study.
3. However, the SFA confounds the eﬀects of misspeciﬁcation of functional form with ineﬃciency. On the other
hand, since DEA is non-parametric, it is less prone to speciﬁcation error, but lumps noise and ineﬃciency together,
calling the combination ineﬃciency.
4. With low-variance values, the probability that u = 0 is high, implying high probability that ﬁrms will be fully
eﬃcient. If the market is competitive, ineﬃcient ﬁrms will be forced out of the market in the long run (i.e., it is
very likely that the surviving ﬁrms will cluster around the fully eﬃcient level). By contrast, if ﬁrms are from a regu-
lated industry, one would expect convergence in eﬃciency to have occurred (eﬃciency levels would be similar
though not necessarily close to 100%). If regulatory incentives are strong, including those for the more eﬃcient
ﬁrms, convergence should tend toward the frontier, again suggesting that the half-normal model would be
appropriate (Kumbhakar et al. 2015).
5. That is, they collect members’ products for sale, and therefore, their customers (buyers) are not their own
members to whom they may not charge the highest possible price.
6. Unlike a classical linear model in which heteroscedasticity aﬀects only the eﬃciency of the estimators and not
their consistency, ignoring heteroscedasticity in the SFA framework leads to inconsistent estimates (Wang and
Schmidt 2002).
7. Since our output variable is proxied by sales, its level has implications for the marketing performance of coopera-
tives as well.
8. Self-initiated refers to member- and community-initiated cooperatives.
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